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 This is a consolidated case involving five Petitioners—
Michael Matthews, David Dupree, Sebastian Williams, Larry 
Smith, and Russell McNeill, III—each of whom have filed 
second or successive habeas petitions under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)1 to challenge their sentences for their 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Each Petitioner’s 
§ 2255 motion argues that § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is 
unconstitutionally vague, given its textual similarity to the 
residual clauses found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015), and 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).  In the time 
since this case was argued before this Court, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in United States v. Davis, striking 
down § 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague.  139 S. Ct. 
2319, 2336 (2019).  The parties concede that the petitions at 
issue are now timely under Davis, thus precluding the need for 
our analysis of the applicability of Johnson and Dimaya to 
these petitions.  For the following reasons, we will authorize 
all of the petitions.2 
                                              
 
1 For ease of reference, we will refer to these simply as 
“§ 2255” petitions.  
 
2 Pending before this Court are approximately two hundred 
such applications that were stayed following the consolidation 
of these five lead applications.  Pursuant to the reasoning 
below, we will authorize these as well.   
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 The five Petitioners in this action were convicted, 
among other offenses, of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), 
which proscribes the use or carry of a firearm during and in 
relation to a “crime of violence” or “drug trafficking crime,” as 
well as the possession of a firearm in the furtherance of any 
such crime.  Section 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” to 
mean a felony offense that “(A) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another” (the “elements” clause) or “(B) 
that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense” (the “residual” clause).  
Under Davis, it is undisputed that Petitioners meet the prima 
facie requirements of this Circuit; therefore, we will authorize 
their petitions.  
A. Michael Matthews  
 Michael Matthews and an accomplice planned, from 
about May 2009 to June 2009, to rob a check cashing store 
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Matthews armed 
himself with a .22 caliber handgun in furtherance of, and to 
effect the object of, the conspiracy.  A grand jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania charged Matthews with one count of 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); one count of attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 3); one count 
of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 4); and one 
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 5).  On February 2, 
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2012, after a jury trial, the District Court entered judgment 
convicting Matthews on all counts, and sentenced him to 120 
months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently on Counts 1, 
3, and 5, followed by 72 months’ imprisonment on the § 924(c) 
count (Count 4), for an aggregate sentence of 192 months’ 
imprisonment.   
 Matthews appealed his judgment of conviction, and this 
Court affirmed.  See United States v. Matthews, 532 F. App’x 
211 (3d Cir. 2013).  Matthews filed a previous 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which the District Court denied on 
July 14, 2015.  He appealed to this Court, which denied a 
certificate of appealability on April 5, 2016.  On April 27, 
2016, Matthews filed an application for authorization to file a 
second or successive § 2255 motion.   
B. David Dupree  
 David Dupree and several accomplices robbed a bank 
located in Lebanon, Pennsylvania on April 15, 2004.  During 
and in relation to the bank robbery, Dupree possessed, carried, 
and brandished a handgun.  A grand jury in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania charged Dupree with one count of armed bank 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (Count 1); one 
count of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 
2); and one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 3).  On November 4, 
2009, after a jury trial, the District Court entered judgment 
convicting Dupree on all counts, and on August 6, 2010, the 
District Court sentenced Dupree to 248 months’ imprisonment 
on Count 1 to be served concurrently with 60 months’ 
imprisonment on Count 3, and a consecutive term of 84 
 8 
 
months’ imprisonment on the § 924(c) count (Count 2), for an 
aggregate sentence of 332 months’ imprisonment.   
 Dupree appealed his judgment of conviction, and this 
Court affirmed.  See United States v. Dupree, 472 F. App’x 108 
(3d Cir. 2012).  Dupree filed a previous 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
motion that was docketed in the District Court on June 15, 
2012.  On October 22, 2012, the court denied the motion.  That 
denial was vacated for procedural reasons, and the District 
Court again denied a renewed § 2255 motion on June 29, 2015.  
Dupree appealed to this Court, which denied a certificate of 
appealability on February 3, 2016.  On April 29, 2016, Dupree 
filed an application for authorization to file a second or 
successive § 2255 motion.   
C. Sebastian Williams  
 Sebastian Williams and several accomplices, from 
March 2002 through August 2002, conspired to rob armored 
cars operated by a business that transported cash in such 
armored cars to and from various customers.  On March 23, 
2002, Williams and a co-conspirator, each armed with a 
handgun, robbed an armored truck of more than $600,000 cash, 
and attempted a second robbery on August 29, 2002.  A grand 
jury in the District of New Jersey charged Williams with two 
counts of conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts 1 and 3); and one count 
of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 
2).  On March 24, 2003, after a jury trial, the District Court 
entered judgment convicting Williams on all counts, and on 
August 18, 2003, the District Court sentenced Williams to 
concurrent terms of 140 months’ imprisonment on Counts 1 
and 3 and a consecutive term of 84 months’ imprisonment on 
 9 
 
the § 924(c) count, for an aggregate sentence of 224 months’ 
imprisonment.  Williams’s conviction and sentence on Count 
2, the § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) count, was premised on the District 
Court’s determination at sentencing that he brandished the 
firearm.   
 Williams appealed his judgment of conviction.  This 
Court upheld the convictions but vacated the sentence and 
remanded for re-sentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the once mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines advisory.  See United States v. 
Williams, 134 F. App’x 510 (3d Cir. 2005).  On remand, the 
District Court re-imposed the same aggregate sentence of 224 
months.  Specifically, Williams was resentenced to 140 months 
on the conspiracy counts, to be served concurrently, and an 
additional term of 84 months on the § 924(c) count.   
 Williams filed a second appeal after his resentencing.  
One of the issues raised was whether his Sixth Amendment 
rights were violated when he was sentenced to a consecutive 
seven-year term of imprisonment under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) for 
brandishing the firearm.  Williams contended that he should 
have received a five-year term instead, for mere use or carrying 
of a firearm, § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), as found by the jury.  This 
Court held, based on the law at the time, that brandishing or 
discharging a firearm in violation of § 924(c) is a sentencing 
factor, rather than an element of the offense, that a judge may 
find to increase a mandatory minimum sentence. 
 Williams has filed one previous 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
motion.  It was denied by the District Court on July 7, 2010.  
He appealed to this Court, which issued an order denying a 
certificate of appealability on November 8, 2010.  On May 10, 
2016, Williams, through counsel, filed an application for 
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authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, and 
on May 12, 2016, Williams filed a pro se application for 
authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.    
D. Larry Smith  
 Larry Smith and his brother robbed a gas station in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at gunpoint in February 2003.  A 
grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged 
Smith with one count of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and 
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); one count 
of attempted carjacking and aiding and abetting, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Count 3); and two counts of using a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Counts 2 and 4).  On September 
29, 2003, after a jury trial, the District Court entered judgment 
convicting Smith on all counts.  On May 7, 2004, the District 
Court sentenced him to 384 months’ imprisonment on the two 
§ 924(c) counts (Counts 2 and 4) plus 24 months’ 
imprisonment for Hobbs Act robbery and carjacking (Counts 1 
and 3).  See United States v. Smith, 225 F. App’x 51, 52 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Smith appealed the amended judgment of 
conviction and this Court affirmed.  Id.  Smith filed a previous 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which the District Court denied on 
April 22, 2009.  On June 18, 2016, Smith filed an application 
for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.   
E. Russell McNeill, III.  
 Russell McNeill, III robbed three stores and a bank over 
the course of three days in April 2006.  A grand jury in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania charged McNeill with three 
counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
(Counts 1, 3, and 5); four counts of brandishing a firearm 
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during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9); one count 
of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count 7); 
and one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (Count 8).  On October 5, 2007, after a 
jury trial, the District Court entered judgment convicting 
McNeill on all counts, and on February 27, 2008, the District 
Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 78 months’ 
imprisonment on Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8, a consecutive term 
of 84 months’ imprisonment on the first § 924(c) count (Count 
2), and 25 years’ imprisonment on each of the three additional 
§ 924(c) counts (Counts 4, 6, and 9), with each of the § 924(c) 
sentences to be served consecutively to one another and 
consecutively to the 78-month concurrent sentence on the non-
§ 924(c) counts, for an aggregate sentence of 1,062 months (or 
88.5 years) of imprisonment.   
 McNeill appealed his judgment of conviction, and this 
Court affirmed.  United States v. McNeill, 360 F. App’x 363 
(3d Cir. 2010).  McNeill has filed one previous 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  On March 26, 2015, the District 
Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part; 
specifically, it vacated its sentence on Count 7 of the 
indictment—the bank robbery count—and denied the motion 
in all other respects.  McNeill did not appeal.  On May 16, 
2016, McNeill filed an application for authorization to file a 
second or successive § 2255 motion.   
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II. DISCUSSION3 
 This Court need not determine the merits of Petitioners’ 
proposed challenges to § 924(c), because the key question is 
whether Petitioners have made a prima facie showing that their 
petitions satisfy the pre-filing requirements of § 2255.  See 
United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 221 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(noting that “[o]ur inquiry does not go . . . deep because we are 
in search of a mere prima facie showing that the petitioner has 
satisfied the pre-filing requirements to warrant full exploration 
by the district court.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
ellipsis omitted)).  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) created a statutory 
“gatekeeping mechanism” for a second or successive habeas 
petition.  In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996)).  Pursuant 
to § 2255, a petitioner’s “second or successive motion must be 
certified as provided in [28 U.S.C. § 2244] by a panel of the 
appropriate court of appeals.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  Section 
2244 lists the pre-filing or gatekeeping requirements applicable 
to motions under § 2255(h)(2): (1) a petitioner must “show[] 
that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,” (2) 
“made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court,” (3) “that was previously unavailable.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).   
 Under § 2244, petitioners must make a prima facie 
showing that their § 2255 motions satisfy these three 
                                              
 
3 This Court has jurisdiction over Petitioners’ applications to 
file a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3).   
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requirements, which this Court has characterized as a “light 
burden.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); Hoffner, 870 F.3d at 307; 
see also In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (“Under our precedent, a prima facie showing in this 
context merely means a sufficient showing of possible merit to 
warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  If the court of appeals 
authorizes the motion, the District Court will have the 
opportunity to “consider anew whether the petitioner” indeed 
meets the § 2244 requirements.  Hoffner, 870 F.3d at 307.  
  The parties concede that, pursuant to Davis, Petitioners’ 
claims are now timely.  See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336 
(“[Section] 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague”).  The 
Government argues that the Panel should nonetheless deny as 
futile the applications of petitioners Dupree, Smith, and 
McNeill because their predicate offenses qualify as crimes of 
violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), unlike those of petitioners 
Matthews and Williams, whose § 924(c) convictions were 
predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracies.  Whether the 
Petitioners’ crimes fall under the elements clause or the 
challenged residual clause is itself a merits inquiry.  See 
Peppers, 899 F.3d at 226 (characterizing the determination of 
whether petitioner’s prior felony convictions qualify under the 
elements clause or the enumerated offenses clause as a merits 
issue).  Therefore, we will not foreclose as futile Petitioners’ 
second or successive § 2255 motions because it is improper at 
this juncture.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioners meet 
the gatekeeping requirements of § 2244, and we will authorize 
all of Petitioners’ second or successive § 2255 motions.   
